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McDaniel 
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Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Whether regulations issued by the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (the "Board"), pursuant to the Homeowner's Loan 
Act of 1933, 12 u.s.c. §1461, et ~· (the "Act"), preempt state -::::::: 
restrictions on enforcement of "due on sale" clauses in mortgages 
N 1 _ -rl. written by federal savings and }.qan associations r-~..~udo- tf. · _/. _,~ .. ~.~ .. 1 O"te:: · \""'-0 \1.) aM ·~ovtod'" ~- Na.t ~~. f-00 Cl~]"--- - I.M~~-· 
S~{fOWN!· 
~ Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
-2-
2. FACTS: In 1976, the Board adopted the following 
regu l ation: 
"A federal association continues to have the 
power t o- include, as a matter of contract between 
it and the borrower, a provision in its loan 
instruments w~eby the assoc1 ation may, at its 
option, d~ immedia~e1y due and payable all 
of the sums secured by t he assoc i a tion's security 
instrument !! all or any part of the ~eal 
property secur1ng the loan i s sold or transferred 
by tBe r>orrower without the associ at i on ' s prior 
written consent." 41 Fed. Reg. 18288 {1976), 
codified at 12 C.F.R. 545.8-3{f). 
Appts are a Federal Savings & Loan Association chartered by 
the Board, pursuant to§ 5{a) of the Act, and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary. Appees are each purchasers of real property which by 
Deed of Trust secures a loan made earlier by appt to the 
transferors of that property. Each of the transferors sold their 
property without appts' prior written consent, even though each 
Deed of Trust includes a clause which provides that if the real 
property is t r ansferred without that consent, Fidelity Federal 
may call the loan due {a "due on sale" clause) • Appts exercised 
their option to declare the balance due and, when the balance was 
not paid, instituted foreclosure proceedings. 
Appees sought to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings in state 
court. 2 They argued· that enforcement of the due on sale clauses 
1This case should be considered along with Nos. 81-922, 
81-992 and 81-993. All of these cases raise the same issue. 
Please read this memo first. 
2Three separate actions were filed1 the cases were 
consolidated before entry of judgment in the trial court, and 
treated as one case in the appellate court. 
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violated California Civil Code §711, which .forbids unreasonable 
restraints on the alienation of real property. The trial court 
granted appts' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the 
state statute was preempted by the federal act and regulations. 
3. DECISION BELOWi The California Appellate Court 
reversed. 3 California law does not permit enforcement of a due 
on sale clause "unless the lender can demonstrate that 
enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect against impairment 
to its security or the risk of default." Wellenkamp v. Bank of 
America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953 (1978). ~idelity Federal did not 
claim such an impairment or a risk of default as a result of the 
sales in question. Therefore, the due on sale clauses could not 
be enforced -- unless, of course, California law is preempted. 
There are at least three parts to the court's preemption 
analysis. First, nothing in the Act demonstrates a clear 
congressional mandate that federal rather than state law shall 
control here. The Act itself makes no reference to the subject 
of due on sale clauses. Second, the "occupation of the field" 
doctrine is not applicable here. Although the Board has plenary 
authority to r~gula~ and control federal savings and loan 
associations, no one suggests that it was the intent of Congress 
to supplant all state laws pertaining to real property and 
mortgages. Federal Savings & Loan Associations have always used 
3The Appellate Court adopted in large measure an op1n1on 
by the Court of Appeal for the First App. Dist. in Panko v. Pan 
American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. Panko is No. 81-922 and 
is straight-lined with this case. 
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and been governed by state real property and mortgage laws in 
respect to numerous matters ~.~., title, conveyancing, 
recording, priority of liens, and proceedings for foreclosure}. 
When the federal government "occupies a field," however, no state 
law pertaining to the "field" is applicable. Third, although the 
Board has manifested its intention that state regulation of due 
on sale clauses be preempted, federal and state regulations in 
this case are not wholly conflicting and the mere expression of 
intent by the Board is not sufficient to preempt state law. 4 The 
federal regulation merely authorizes federal savings and loan 
associations to include a due on sale clause in their loan 
contracts; it does not compel their use or enforcement. 
California law permits enforcement of such a clause only upon a 
showing that the lender's security may be at risk as a 
consequence of the transfer. Thus, it is not physically 
impossible for a federal association to comply with the two 
regulatory schemes. 
The court also noted that the following provision was 
included in two of the three Deeds of Trust: "This Deed of Trust 
-----------shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the 
property is located." 5 In its view this clause meant that state 
4rn the preamble to the regulation, 12 c.F.R. ~ ll(f}, 
the Board stated that "it was and is the Board's intention to 
have • • • due on sale practices of federal associations governed 
exclusively by federal law. • • • Federal associations shall not 
be bound by or subject to any conflicting state law which imposes 
different ••• due on sale requirements." 
Footnote(s} 5 will appear on following pages. 
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law was to govern the interpretation, validity and enforcement of 
the loan security instrument. This includes the limitation on 
enforcement of due on sale provisions. It rejected the argument 
of FHLMC, which had appeared as an amicus, that state law 
includes all federal law the state is required to enforce by 
preemption or otherwise. 
The California Supreme Court denied review. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Appts note that there are hundreds of 
similar cases pending in the California courts against other 
federal associations. The California court's holding will have a 
substantial effect on the ability of the Board to assure the 
stability of the federal savings and loan system, as well as on 
the secondary mortgage market. On the substantive question, 
appts begin with the proposition that federal regulations preempt 
state law when their preemptive intent is clear and the 
regulations are not inconsistent with federal law under which 
they are promulgated. ~ v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 
151 (1978). The federal regulation at issue here was fashioned 
by the Board with the express intent of preempting state laws. 
The Board's regulation is entirely consistent with the Act's 
purpose of creating and maintaining an economically viable 
federal savings and loan system: The Board has concluded that 
the ability of a federal association to exercise a due on sale 
5This is a uniform prov1s1on used in the form instruments 
promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
("FHLMC"), use of which is a precondition to the purchase of a 
mortgage by FHLMC. 
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clause at the lender's option is necessary to the stability of 
the federal savings and loan system. The state court avoided 
finding a direct conflict by distinguishing between permissive 
and mandatory provisions. This distinction is not persuasive 
because the state law flatly precludes that which the federal law 
embraces. Other courts have found preemption in situations 
involving "permissive" federal regulations. See Meyers v. 
Beverly Hills Federal Saving & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 {CA 9 
1974) {involving prepayment penalties for early repayment of 
mortgage loans). Moreover, in Conference of Federal Savings & 
Loan Associations v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 {CA 9 1979), aff'd, 445 
u.s. 921 {1980), the CA 9 held that the Act was a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme intended by Congress to preempt all state laws 
which sought in any way to regulate or control the operation of 
federal savings and loan associations: "The broad regulatory 
authority over the federal associations conferred upon the Bank 
Board by HOLA does wholly preempt the field of regulatory control 
over these associations." Id. at 1260. This Court summarily 
affirmed that decision. In contrast, the California court 
distinguished the "internal" and "external" activities of federal 
associations and held that while the Board has complete authority 
to regulate the internal affairs of federal associations, it does 
not have such authority over its external affairs. Appts point 
. out that numerous courts have upheld the preemptive power of 
federal regulations dealing with aspects of the lender/borrower 
relationship. Finally, appts contend that the "law of the 
jurisdiction clause in the Deed of Trust did not preclude a 
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finding of preemption because the law of the state necessarily 
includes preemptive federal law." See Hauenstein v. Lynhan, 100 
u.s. 483 (1880}.6 
Appees primarily adopt the argument of the California court. 
The state has not attempted to regulate federal associations~ 
rather, Cal. Civil Code §711 is a substantive rule of real 
property, which incidently infringes upon the federal 
associations' transactions. There is ample room, whatever the 
Board's authority, for continued state regulation of real 
property. Moreover, under the federal regulation it would be 
permissible for any and all federal associations to contract to 
enforce the due on sale clause only when a transfer impairs their 
security: a state law which achieves the same result does not 
conflict with the Act. Finally, this Court need not reach the 
issue of whether Civil Code § 711 conflicts with the federal 
regulation, because two of the deeds of trust were executed prior 
to the effective date of the regulation (July 31, 1976}, and the 
judgment with respect to the third transaction rests on an 
adequate nonfederal basis 
jurisdiction" clause.7 
the contractual "law of the 
Appts reply to this final argument, as follows. Whether a 
federal lender by contract has waived a federal right is a 
6Appts contend that the California court incorrectly 
believed this clause to be in two of the deeds, when it was only 
in one. 
7Appees also suggest that this last argument justifies 
this Court's dismissal of the case. 
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question of federal, not state law. Moreover, the California 
courts' discussion of this issue is only dicta: It was 
unnecessary to reach the issue after holding that the federal 
regulations were not preemptive. With respect to the deeds 
executed before the 1976 effective date of the regulation, appts 
reply that the regulation "merely codified what had been 
consistently the policy and position of the Bank Board." The 
regulation itself starts with the phrase "An association 
continues to have the power to include . " 
The SG has filed an amicus brief for the Board. The Board 
contends that the decision below will seriously impair the 
federal government's efforts to control federal savings and loan 
associations' mortgage rates. Insofar as the California court's 
decision rests on the view that the Board's authority is limited 
to regulating the internal affairs of savings and loan 
associations, it conflicts with numerous decisions which have 
upheld the Board's pervasive regulatory control. See,~-~·, 
Stein, supra (reporting and notice requirements regarding 
possible discriminatory lending practices)~ First Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass'n of Boston v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (CA 1 1979) 
(payment of interest on escrow accounts)~ Kupiec v. Republic 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 512 F.2d 147, 150 (CA 7 1975) 
(methods of supplying notice to Association members)~ Kaski v. 
"First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Madison, 240 N.W . 2d 367 
(Wis. 1976) (prepayment penal ties) • The CA 5, however, has also - ----concluded that the Board's power is limited to controlling 
internal affairs of federal associations. Gulf Federal Savings & 
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Loan Ass'n of Jefferson Parish v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
651 F.2d 259, 266 (1981). He also challenges the California 
courts' suggestion that a different standard of preemption 
applies when a federal administrative agency is the source of a 
federal rule, as opposed to an Act of Congress directly. This 
Court has long-recognized that an administrative regulation which 
properly implements a statute has the identical preemptive 
effect. See Free v. Bland, 369 u.s. 663, 668 (1962). 
Appees have filed a reply to the Board's brief which notes 
that legislation is pending which addresses the issue involved in 
this case. These bills, S.l720 and S.l703, would provide for 
federal preemption of any state law prohibiting enforcement of 
the due on sale clause. Since passage of this legislation would 
moot this case, appees contend that the Court should dismiss or 
affirm without a hearing. 
5. DISCUSSION: This appears to be a proper appeal under 28 
u.s.c. §1257(2); appts expressly raised the constitutional 
validity of Civil Code §711 and the California court upheld the 
state provision in the fact of this preemption claim. There is 
little reason to question appts' and the Board's contention that 
the California decision will have a drastic effect on the 
availability of mortgages from federal savings and loan 
· associations and on the secondary market in mortgages. Due on 
sale clauses shorten the average life of a conventional mortgage 
and thus permit lenders to increase the interest they can charge 
on long-term loan commitments during periods of rising interest 
rates. On the merits, both of the distinctions that stand behind 
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the California court's opinion -- that between the internal and 
external affairs of the association and that between preemption 
by statute and by federal regulation -- are not very persuasive. 
As appts and the SG point out, numerous courts have upheld the 
authority of the Board to regulate the relationship between 
federal savings and loan associations and their borrowers. 
Federal regulations, consistent with their authorizing statutes, 
are just as capable of preempting state laws as are the statutes 
themselves. Nor do I think the state court is very convincing in 
its claim that the state effort to prohibit what the federal law 
permits does not directly conflict with the federal regulation. 
I recommend that the Court note probable jurisdiction. 
There is a motion to affirm or dismiss, a reply brief, two 
amicus briefs (one filed by the SG and one by the California 
Secretary of Business Transportation and Housing), and a reply to 
the SG's brief. 
January 13, 1982 
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